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Abstract—It has been noted in the literature that firms rarely
follow a single theoretical model when designing their compen-
sation policy. This study illustrates how a fuzzy cluster analysis
can be helpful in understanding the way employees are rewarded
according to firms’ specificity and market conditions. For this
purpose, we convert linked employer-employee data (LEED) into
firm level data prior to fuzzy clustering. Then, we explore the
particular distribution of firms on the emerged fuzzy partition
to sort them by compensation policy and, eventually, to examine
the potential factors behind a specific option.
I. INTRODUCTION
This paper revisits and expands on the methodological
aspects of a comprehensive study on compensation policies
carried out in [21]. Compensation policy entails different
dimensions of pay, notably pay level, pay grades, pay growth,
pay flexibility, and pay penalty. Firms configure these dimen-
sions according to their own specificity. We can therefore
expect them to vary across firms, thus giving rise to a
heterogeneous population. In this study, we explore the fuzzy
sets theory to model the diversity of compensation policies,
and further investigate the characteristics of firms that might
affect those policies. Readers interested in furthering their
understanding of aspects of economic theory on this subject
may refer to [21].
The problem we are addressing can be framed as follows.
The theoretical models for compensation policy are useful
tools to segment firms according to the way they reward
employees. Two broad and almost antagonistic models are
identified as Internal Labor Market (ILM) and External Labor
Market (ELM).
The ILM model follows the rationale of fostering a long-
term relationship between employees and organizations while
simultaneously protecting investments in firm-specific skills
[9]. The wages are attached to jobs rather than to workers,
grow with tenure, and more importantly, are not adjusted to
the business cycles or other external factors. There is also a
limited discretion on wages. The ELM model has the opposite
characteristics and is highly responsive to market conditions.
However, employers generally use a variety of incentive
devices to obtain more advantages from employees. This
includes, among others, high pay to avoid shirking [16],
reduction employee turnovers [15], rewarding high-performers
through group or individual incentives [11] or differentiating
the key group of employees [14]. Hence, we can expect firms
to tailor the compensation policy so as to suit their specificities
and, of course, to face the market conditions. Despite the
expected diversity among firms, we nonetheless believe that
some, say c  2 models or, more appropriately, typologies
of compensation policy prevail, and the way firms position
themselves in the labor market is a matter of degree in each ty-
pology. This hybrid characteristic of compensation policies is
stressed by Baker in [1]. Therefore, we use a fuzzy clustering
approach to empirically examine firms’ compensation policy in
the Portuguese labor market. In a post-hoc analysis, we attempt
to identify the factors explaining the emerged typologies.
II. DESCRIPTION OF DATA
The Portuguese LEED, called Quadros de Pessoal (QP), are
our source data. The QP is a longitudinal data set compiled
annually by the Ministry of Economy and Employment, and
is mandatory for every firm with wage earners (see e.g.
[4]). We limit our focus to large-sized firms, i.e.  250
workers. This option aims to prevent additional heterogeneity
due to firms’ size. The sample we are working with comprises
N = 669 firms, and is related to the year of 2009. The
longitudinal information, whenever necessary, is based on the
period 2004  2009.
Since the firms are at the heart of our analysis, we first
convert the employee-wise data into firm level data, following
a strategy similar to that of [12]. The resulting constructs are
intended to reflect the mechanisms behind the design of a
compensation policy, as detailed in [21]. We can divide the
underlying variables into two major groups: internal and ex-
ternal [17]. The internal variables are, on substantive grounds,
potentially important to profile the emerged compensation ty-
pologies. In turn, the external variables are used to a posteriori
identify the factors behind each typology, and can be useful
tools for predictive purposes. Below, we present each group
separately and, where necessary, summarize the purpose of
each variable.
A. Internal variables
There are nI = 15 internal variables, which can be arranged
in four distinct dimensions of pay, as follows.
Pay Levels (8):
- Hourly wage: position of the firm in the labor market;
- Firm / industry wage: position of the firm in the correspon-
ding industry;
- Gini: inequality of wage distribution;
- Skewness: wages asymmetry;
- Entry wage: competition around skills;
- Education premium: value of general skills;
- Wage hierarchy: job hierarchy;
- Intra job dispersion: internal equity and incentive devices.
Pay Growth (3):
- Wage growth: (self-explanatory);
- Growth skewness: selective incentive devices;
- Tenure profile: firm-specific skills.
Pay Flexibility (3):
- Wage cushion: incentive device measuring the difference
between the total wage and the wage that has been bar-
gained;
- Wage adjustment: wage used as adjustment to the business
cycle;
- Rent sharing: incentive device.
Pay Penalty (1):
- Gender wage gap: penalization of female workers.
B. External variables
The following nE = 13 external variables are used to
characterize fuzzy clusters in a post hoc analysis. Ten vari-
ables are numerical and three are categorical. For the latter
ones we indicate, in parenthesis, the respective categories,
thus making their meaning clearer. The numerical variables,
all self-explanatory, are: Percentage of fixed term contracts;
Percentage of part-time workers; Percentage of female wor-
kers; Percentage of young workers, Percentage of blue collar
workers; Firm dimension (number of workers); Firm age; Firm
growth (in terms of the number of workers); Sales per worker
(as a proxy of productivity); and Coefficient of variation of
firm’s sales (as a measure of sales volatility). For the growth
variable, which accounts for the evolution and the competitive
dynamic, we trace firm data back to 2004.
The three categorical variables are: C1 : Collective bar-
gaining level (Single, Collective, Industry or Other agree-
ment); C2 : Share holding (National private capital, Public,
Foreign, Mixed or Other); and C3 : Industry affiliation (Less
knowledge-intensive service (KIS), Medium-high technology
industry (TI), Medium-low TI, Low TI, High technology KIS,
Market KIS, Knowledge intensive (KI) financial service, Other
KIS, High TI, Other less KIS, Primary sector, or Construction).
The categories of the affiliation variable are in accordance with
EUROSTAT [10].
In sum: we use internal variables to cluster firms by
compensation policy and, subsequently, examine the potential
factors behind a specific option, using external variables.
III. DATA ANALYSIS
A. Fuzzy clustering
We opt for a fuzzy clustering based on a matrix factorization
approach, since we are interested in profiling wage policies
that are somewhat extreme. This is expected to allow us to
position firms in a structure set out by extreme profiles [13].
The prior assumption behind this approach is that the data
matrix can be decomposed into a product of two matrices.
Formally, suppose X = [xjk] 2 RnN is the data matrix,
where n  2 is the dimension of the feature space, and N
is the sample size. In our case, n = nI = 15 is the number
of internal variables, and N = 669. We assume there are two
matrices, U and V, such that
X = VU, (1)
although, in practice, we find an approximate decomposition
of X. In this relation, V = [vji] 2 Rnc and U =
[ik] 2 [0; 1]cN , c  2,
Pc
i=1 ik = 1; 1  k  N , and
0 <
PN
k=1 ik < N , 1  i  c. The factorization (1),
together with the restrictions on ik, maps X into a fuzzy
c-partition. The columns of V are referred to as prototypes
and ik is the membership degree of kth data point, xk, in
fuzzy cluster i. Furthermore, the product (1) has a geometrical
interpretation; it configures a polytope, say Pc, with c extreme
points, spanned by c columns of the matrix V, v1, v2, :::,
vc. Therefore, the data points are, by assumption, drawn
from Pc as convex combinations of the fuzzy c-partition
prototypes. As usual, each data point xk is represented in
a fuzzy c-partition by the vector of membership degrees,
k = (1k; 2k; :::; ck) 2 Sc, where Sc is the unit simplex
Sc =
(
(a1; a2; :::; ac) : 0  ai  1 ^
cX
i=1
ai = 1
)
,
and here, in particular,
xk =
cX
i=1
ikvi.
A common procedure to estimate the matrices U and V,
given c, is to minimize the objective function
Jc =
1
2
kX VUk2F , (2)
subject to the constraints on membership degrees ik referred
to above. Here, kAkF is the Frobenius norm of the matrix A.
We note, however, that, given V, the minimization of Jc in (2)
reduces to N independent least squares problems. Therefore,
a common solver can be used to estimate U. This means the
factorization of the data matrix X is ultimately dependent on
the way we estimate the matrix of prototypes V.
In this study, we use the archetypal analysis [7] approach
to estimate V. Accordingly, the prototypes, now archetypes,
are themselves convex combinations of the data points,
vi =
NX
k=1
kixk; i = 1; 2; :::; c,
where 0  ki  1 and
P
k ki = 1. As a result, the esti-
mation of the matrix V reduces here to the estimation of the
coefficients ki. In practice, we use an alternate optimization
between U and V; the ki coefficients are estimated using the
updating rule given by Ding, Li, and Jordan in [8]; the matrix
U is estimated by means of MATLAB function lsqlin(), with
‘interior-point algorithm’ option [6].
We note that, in [21], V is estimated using the factorized
fuzzy c-means algorithm [20], which is akin to that of [3].
It is a special case of the archetypal analysis, where the 
weights are calculated from the membership degrees ik, and
not estimated explicitly.
B. Compensation typologies
Following [21], we use the Xie and Beni index [22] to
assess the goodness-of-fit of the estimated fuzzy c-partitions.
The best fit is achieved for c = 3 clusters, meaning that
the compensation policies of the Portuguese labor market of
large-sized firms can be modeled by a fuzzy 3-partition. This
result, as well as the profile of the emerged fuzzy clusters
displayed in Table I, is consistent with the earlier work. In
this table, the archetypes are identified as A1, A2 and A3; in
the second column, we represent the sample average values,
for comparison purposes.
TABLE I
CHARACTERIZATION OF FUZZY 3-PARTITION PROTOTYPES. THE SECOND
COLUMN SHOWS THE MEAN VALUES OF THE SAMPLE AS A WHOLE.
Variable Sample A1 A2 A3
Hourly wage 5:23 3:51 3:89 9:63
Firm / industry wage 0:03  0:12  0:08 0:38
Gini 0:24 0:19 0:23 0:27
Skewness 4:58 8:32 3:24 3:11
Entry wage  0:13  0:10  0:12  0:17
Education premium 0:34 0:28 0:40 0:29
Wage hierarchy  0:64  0:57  0:66  0:65
Intra job dispersion 0:25 0:22 0:23 0:33
Wage growth 0:04 0:04 0:04 0:06
Growth skewness 2:56 2:45 2:56 2:64
Tenure profile 0:19 0:17 0:20 0:19
Wage cushion 1:95 1:57 1:66 2:88
Wage adjustment  0:34  0:54  0:32  0:28
Rent sharing 0:08 0:09 0:06 0:12
Gender wage gap 0:21 0:24 0:19 0:21
We can label the compensation policies underlying the
estimated archetypes as follows: A1 – Competitive, A2 –
quasi-Internal Labor Market (q-ILM), and A3 – Incentive.
At first glance, A1 and A3 typologies represent two extreme
types of compensation policy, while the q-ILM appears as an
intermediate case. For example, A1 has the lowest levels of
wage (3:51); the incentive devices target a small proportion of
employees who earn higher wages, while a large proportion
of employees earn low wages (Skewness = 8:32); and wages
are particularly procyclical as they fall in response to an
increase in unemployment (Wage adjustment =  0:54). Firms
clustered in A3 pay the highest wage (9:63), and above
the industry level (Firm/industry wage = 0:38). These firms
use several incentive devices, notably wage cushion (2:88),
differentiation of employees in same jobs (Intra-job dispersion
= 0:33), reward high-performers through specific wage growth
(Growth skewness = 2:64) and rent sharing schemes (0:12).
The distinctive features of q-ILM (A2) are the tenure wage
profile, which suggests that individual wages grow with the
length of contract (Tenure profile = 0:20) and the returns to
education (Education premium = 0:40).
We note, however, that some characteristics occur across all
typologies. Without going into detail, we stress the striking
similarity of fuzzy clusters in the use of wages as an adjust-
ment process. This evidence is in line with [5], since wages are
highly responsive to macroeconomic conditions in Portugal.
Fig. 1. An empirical distribution of firms on unit simplex S3.
In Fig. 1 we depict, in the unit simplex S3, the estimated
membership degree vectors of every firm to gain a more
accurate picture of their distribution on the polytope P3. If we
further accept 0:90 as the threshold for the full membership in
each fuzzy cluster, we realize (Table II) that only 35% of firms
share the characteristics of a single typology. This means, most
firms’ compensation policy mixes characteristics of different
typologies, as claimed in the literature [1]. However, a closer
look at Table II evidences the concentration on the edges or,
equivalently, in two fuzzy clusters, since 21% of firms have
membership in A1   A2, 23:6% in A2   A3, and 6:7% in
A1 A3. In particular, more than 80% of firms are positioned
on the path of edges A1  A2  A3, including typologies.
TABLE II
DISTRIBUTION OF FIRMS ON THE FUZZY 3-PARTITION, AS REPRESENTED
BY THE UNIT SIMPLEX S3 (MEMBERSHIP IN Ai ^Aj MEANS NONZERO
PARTIAL MEMBERSHIP IN FUZZY CLUSTERS Ai AND Aj , @0:90;
OVERLAPPED CASES ARE ACCOUNTED FOR ONLY ONCE).
Membership in Total (669)
A1 A2 A3
72 99 63 234
10:8% 14:8% 9:4% 35:0%
A1 ^A2 A2 ^A3 A1 ^A3
146 158 45 349
21:8% 23:6% 6:7% 52:1%
A1 ^A2 ^A3 86
12:9%
C. Post-hoc analysis
A common procedure to study the potential factors behind
a compensation policy would be to defuzzify the membership
degrees, and subsequently analyze the pattern of external
variables in each crisp typology. However, the distribution of
firms on the path A1   A2   A3 allows us to reasonably use
the theorem below, which is established in [19]. It allows a
mapping between multivariate data and a real interval, via
fuzzy c-partition. The notation Ai ! Aj indicates that we
steadily move along the edge Ai  Aj , from the vertex Ai to
the vertex Aj , j > i.
Theorem 1: Consider a fuzzy c-partition of the data matrix
X, and let Sc be the corresponding unit simplex. Let the
vertices of Sc be enumerated as A1, A2, :::, Ac. Assume
that each data point has membership in one or, at most, two
consecutive fuzzy clusters, that is, positioned on the edge Ai 
Ai+1, 1  i  c  1, of Sc. Then, the utility function
 (k) =
cX
i=1
 (i)ik
increases from  (1) to  (c) in the path of edges A1 ! A2 !
::: ! Ac, provided  (i) is a strictly increasing sequence of
real numbers. 
In our example, if two firms k and k0 are positioned on
the edge A1   A2, and  (k) <  (k0), then the firm k0 is
closer to q–ILM typology than the firm k; reciprocally, this
firm is closer to the Competitive typology than the former.
The utility function  is, therefore, a scalar indicator of firms’
compensation policy, at least of those positioned on the path
A1   A2   A3. We explore this in an attempt to identify the
potential factors that might be conditioning firms’ individual
option.
Even though the results of fuzzy clustering of firm data
do not fully meet the conditions of the above theorem, we
believe that it can be used as a good approximation. The major
difficulty lies in the selection of the sequence  (i), which can
be subjective. Here, we consider a 0   1 normalization of
hourly wage in each typology (Table I, fist row), which leads
to  (1) = 0,  (2) = 0:06, and  (3) = 1. We subsequently use
the resulting utility function  2 [0; 1] in a regression analysis,
with the expectation of predicting the compensation policy by
means of external variables. In sum, the variation of the utility
function from 0 to 1 approximately translates the gradual
movement of compensation policies from the Competitive
typology to Incentive typology, passing through q-ILM (see
Fig. 1); we therefore explore it for prediction purposes.
Due to the limited range of the utility function , we opt for
a Tobit regression model. This model can formally be written
as a relationship between the observed outcome, here  (k),
and the latent variable of interest,  (k), as follows [18]:
 (k) =
8<: 0 if 
 (k)  0
 (k) if 0 <  (k) < 1
1 if  (k)  1
,
for each firm k = 1; 2; :::; 669. The nE external variables, say
z = (z1; z2; :::; znE ), are linearly related to 
, i.e.
 (k) = 0 + 1z1k + 2z2k + :::+ "k,
where 0 is the constant term, 1, 2, :::, are the Tobit re-
gression coefficients, and "k is an independent normal random
variable, with zero mean and constant variance 2. In this
context, the  coefficient associated with a numerical variable
has the same meaning as in ordinary least squares regression,
whereas the coefficient of a categorical variable measures the
impact of a given category when compared to the category
that has been chosen as the reference. Some missing values
in external variables are replaced by the corresponding mean
value. The results of Tobit regression are displayed in Table
III. The overall model fit, based on McKelvey & Zavoina’s
coefficient of determination, is R2 = 0:68, which indicates a
good predictive power.
TABLE III
TOBIT REGRESSION  COEFFICIENT ESTIMATES, AND THE ASSOCIATED
STATISTICS, FOR THE EXTERNAL VARIABLES.
External Variable  Coefficient Std. Err. p-value
% fixed term contracts  0:1545 0:0406 0:000
% part-time workers 0:3752 0:0621 0:000
% female workers  0:1571 0:0401 0:000
% young workers  0:6205 0:0559 0:000
% blue collar workers  0:4021 0:0363 0:000
Firm dimension  0:0010 0:0005 0:045
Firm age  0:0002 0:0002 0:281
Firm growth 0:0326 0:0317 0:304
Sales per worker 0:0783 0:0080 0:000
CV of firm sales  0:0019 0:0292 0:947
C1: Collective bargain. level
Collective firms agreement 0:2521 0:0398 0:000
Single firm agreement 0:1836 0:0311 0:000
Others 0:1163 0:0254 0:000
C2: Share holding
Public 0:0938 0:0359 0:009
Foreign 0:0323 0:0214 0:131
Mixed 0:1116 0:0285 0:000
Others  0:0667 0:0389 0:067
C3: Industry affiliation
Less KIS  0:1093 0:0360 0:003
Medium-high TI  0:0286 0:0407 0:485
Low TI  0:0064 0:0362 0:859
High KIS 0:1919 0:0544 0:000
Market KIS 0:0815 0:0443 0:067
KI financial service 0:1859 0:0552 0:001
Other KIS 0:0140 0:0470 0:776
High TI 0:0139 0:0752 0:854
Other less KIS  0:0133 0:0664 0:824
Primary sector  0:1456 0:1031 0:156
Construction 0:0880 0:0403 0:029
Constant term 0  0:2206 0:1116 0:049
Dependent variable:  (k); the reference categories of categorical variables are:
C1: Industry-level bargaining; C2: National private capital; C3: Medium-low TI.
(KIS: knowledge-intensive service; TI: technology industry).
Obs. summary: 0 left-censored; 620 uncensored; 49 right-censored.
In general terms, when a numerical variable with positive
 increases, the compensation policy moves in the direction
Competitive ! q-ILM ! Incentive; the reverse holds true
when  is negative. In the case of categorical variables, the
coefficient of a given category weights its relative importance
in moving in one or other direction. Looking at Table III,
we realize that the workers with fixed-term contract prevail
in firms closer to the Competitive typology, while part-time
workers push firms to the Incentive typology. This only
partially confirms the labor market segmentation theory, since
we would expect both groups of workers to be present in firms
sharing the characteristics of the former typology.
Female, blue-collar, and young workers tend to be associa-
ted with firms paying lower and flexible wages, that is, those
closer to the Competitive typology. It is expected that high-
skill workers (white collar workers) are employed in firms
paying higher wages. Whereas no significant differentiation
in wage typologies is found in manufacturing, the same does
not hold in services, where significant industry differences are
found, in accordance with knowledge intensity. Less know-
ledge intensive services (KIS) pushes them to Competitive
typology, contrasting with more KIS (High technology KIS,
market KIS, and KI Financial Services), which tends to push
them in the opposite direction. As expected, the q-ILM and
Incentive typologies are common in banking industry, while
strategies to reduce labor costs are found in labor intensive
services with low knowledge intensity.
Firms using decentralized bargaining systems (multiple or
single firm arrangements) are closer to the Incentive typology,
possibly because they allow more scope for rewarding skills.
Larger firms are more prone to share characteristics of the
Competitive typology; this finding contradicts some studies,
since larger firms are likely to pay higher wages [2]. Most
probably, this is due to the specificities of the Portuguese
labor market, where a significant number of large firms follow
generic low value added strategies, and use low-skilled wor-
kers. Finally, firms with higher sales per worker tend towards
the Incentive typology, which signals an association between
higher wages and labor productivity.
IV. CONCLUSION
We use a fuzzy cluster analysis to quantify the mixing
characteristics of firms’ compensation policy that has long
been reported in the literature. We find three broad typologies
in the Portuguese labor market, and realize that none fits
most firms (65%) exactly. However, the heterogeneity within
firms is seemingly not so extreme, since more than 80% of
estimated compensation policies result from sharing, at most,
two consecutive typologies. As a consequence, we extend the
use of the fuzzy representation of firms, by taking advantage
of a result that, under certain conditions, provides a scalar
measure for multivariate data as mapped into a fuzzy c-
partition. We are able to reasonably predict the expected
compensation policy of a given firm by means of what we
refer to as external variables. This can be a useful decision tool
for policy makers. We note that some of our conclusions are
in line with those reported in studies using different types of
data analysis, which gives us confidence in the results achieved
and in continuing this investigation under the framework of the
fuzzy sets theory.
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